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Abstract
For simple economic models of transfrontier pollution, Chander and Tulkens (1995) and
(1997) have offered a formula for transfers to sustain international cooperation on a voluntary
basis and which deter coalitionnal free−riding under some reasonable behaviours of countries
not in the coalition. Their scheme rests on the assumption that pollution is a scalar. Relaxing
this assumption, interesting interactions among pollutants arise that call for a new formula. In
this paper we extend Chander and Tulkens formula for this more realistic multidimensional
context, and thereby enhance the pratical and theoretical relevance of their seminal analysis.
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For simple fundamental economic models of transfrontier pollution Chan-
der and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) (CT hereafter) have o¤ered a scheme of
transfers to implement Pareto e¢cient decisions. The transfers they have
proposed have the two following properties, which are particularly desirable
when dealing with the cooperation of interacting sovereign countries: i) the
international optimum is a voluntary one, ii) it is robust against the temp-
tation of free-riding by some of the countries (or groups of countries). This
scheme has also proved useful in related questions, for instance in the study
of stock-pollution (Germain et al 1998 and 2002), and of negotiation process
(Chander and Tulkens 1992, Chander 1995).
CT’s scheme applies when the production of a private good induces the
emission of a single pollutant, or equivalently to situations where, for some
reasons, the single pollution problem under consideration can be treated
in isolation of other pollution problems. Otherwise interesting problems of
interaction between pollutants arise that call for an integrated analysis.1
Clearly an integrated analysis is also needed for the de…nition of coalition-
proof transfers. Our paper o¤ers an extension of CT’s transfers formula to
a multidimensional framework and thus substantially enhance its practical
and theoretical relevance.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a multi-pollutant
variant of CT’s’ model. Section 3 analyzes coalitional behaviours that could
potentially object against an optimum; we then build on this equilibrium
concept to o¤er a formula that Nash-implements an e¢cient decisions pro…le
which is robust against the temptation to deviate by any coalition. Section
4 concludes.
2 An economy with many pollutants
The model presented in this section is a multi-pollutant version of CT, from
which we shall borrow the basic notation.
Consider a set N of n countries and two kinds of commodities: i)ah o -
1Interactions between pollutants is one of the salient aspects of the so-called Integrated
Assessment models that analyze the impacts of a warmer climate and possible mitigation
policies. See for instance Nordhaus (1993), Nordhaus and Yang (1996), Nordhaus and
Boyer (1999).
1mogenous private good, whose quantities are denoted x ¸ 0 when consumed
and y ¸ 0 when produced, ii)p o l l u t a n td i s c h a r g e d .
We depart from CT’s model in that we introduce any number of pol-
lutants, say m ¸ 1, instead of only one; think for instance about water
pollution, air pollution, etc...
In the notations to follow superscripts refer to countries, whereas sub-
scripts refer to commodities, and bold characters are used for vectors or
matrices. The quantities of pollutant h discharged in country i are denoted
by pi
h ¸ 0,a n dph 2 Rn
+ is the n-dimensional vector made of the non negative
components pi
h. For notational convenience it will also prove useful to intro-
duce pi 2 Rm
+; the m-dimensional vector of pollutant discharges in country
i,a n dp¡i 2 R
(n¡1)
+ £ Rm
+ the (n ¡ 1) £ m matrix of pollutant discharges
produced by the remaining countries.
The addition of discharges h by all the countries result in a total ambient






h;h =1 ;:::;m : (1)
We call these ambient pollutants “public bads” : they have the characteristics
of public goods, but their e¤ect on all the countries is negative.
In country i the representative agent is endowed with a linear utility
function de…ned over his consumption of the private homogenous good xi












h ¸ 0 ; 8i;8h: (2)
Note that utilities are country speci…c. The essence of the problem comes
from the heterogeneity of national preferences.
The production of the private good denoted yi generates as a by-product
some unavoidable pollution; in other words the emissions pi
h can be seen as








2A feasible state of the economy is a vector (x1;:::;xn;p1;:::;pm;z 1;:::;zm),












In this context with international public bads it is possible to single out
a unique Pareto e¢cient decisions vector; it is such that the social marginal
disutility of each pollutant is equal to the marginal utility this pollutant
produces by increasing the private good consumption. Therefore this vector














Thanks to the e¢ciency conditions (5), we can compute the corresponding
levels of public bads:




h =1 ;:::;m :
From (5) it follows that there is a unique production vector b y =( b y1;:::; b yn);
but there is an in…nite number of combinations for the private good consump-
tions b x =( b x1;:::; b xn) consistent with (4) and therefore an in…nite number
of Pareto e¢cient states, denoted (b x1;:::; b xn; b p1;:::; b pm; b z1;:::; b zm),w h i c hw e
shall refer to as feasible international optima.
For further use the notation b Ui = V i(b xi; b z1;:::; b zm) stands for state i’s
utility evaluated at an international optimum.
3 Coalition-proof transfers to sustain an in-
ternational optimum
The cooperative game with transferable payo¤s corresponding to our econ-
omy is de…ned by the pair [N;w] of its players set N (the set of countries)
and the characteristic function w(S) that associates with every subset S of
the n players a number called the worth of S. Following CT we assume
3that when a coalition forms, the players outside the coalition behave non
cooperatively in their own best individual interest, taking the other players’
decisions as given. This leads us to consider a Nash equilibrium with respect
to a coalition S where the coalition is viewed as a single player.2
Each country faces the following budget constraint for the private good
consumption: xi = yi;i2 N: Using this budget constraint, (1), (2), and (3),
























Formally, a partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to a coali-
tion consists of a decision pro…le (e p1;:::; e pm) which simultaneously solves the
following problems:




Ui(pi;p¡i), given the pro…le of decisions
outside the coalition
ii) outside the coalition: Max
pi Ui(pi;p¡i), taking as given the other players’
decisions.
The above equilibrium concept underlies the °-characteristic function
w°(S), which is de…ned as w°(S)=
P
i2S
Ui(e pi; e p¡i):
The …rst order conditions for the maximization problem of the members












The …rst order conditions for the maximization problems outside the coali-







;i 2 N n S:
2See CT for a detailed exposition of this concept and a discussion of the other possible
assumptions made in the literature as for the behaviours of the non-members of S.
4The outcome associated with this concept corresponds to a state of the
economy called a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition
denoted (e x1;:::; e xn; e p1;:::; e pm; e z1;:::; e zm): We denote e Ui = V i(~ xi; ~ z1;:::; ~ zm)
the utility of state i associated to the partial agreement equilibrium with
respect to a coalition.
As a particular case, when the coalition under consideration is made
of only one country the above concept boils down to a Nash equilibrium.
This Nash equilibrium corresponds to a so-called disagreement equilibrium
for the economy denoted (¹ x1;:::; ¹ xn;¹ p1;:::;¹ pm; ¹ z1;:::; ¹ zm): The notation U
i =
V i(¹ xi; ¹ z1;:::; ¹ zm) is used for state i’s utility computed at the disagreement
equilibrium.






¹ xi; and b zh ¸ ~ zh > ¹ zh for each pollutant h, meaning that
the international optimum is characterized by a resource allocation favoring
less pollution and less private good.
Having described the countries’ behaviours, individually or in coalition,
we now turn to the de…nition of transfers that would lead to an feasible
international optimum, with the condition of this outcome being coalition-
proof.
A strategy pro…le of all the countries is said to belong to the °-core of
the game [N;w°(S)] if for any coalition S µ N the payo¤s it yields to the
members of S is not lower than w°(S); i.e. the payo¤ that S can achieve by
itself. In their models with only one public bad, CT have proposed a speci…c
formula for transfers leading to an international optimum in the °-core, thus
with the attractive properties that: i) it is individually rational, ii)i ti s
also robust to free-riding by coalitions in the sense captured by the partial
agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition. I na ne x t e n d e dc o n t e x t
with several pollutants what would be the adequate form for such transfers?









































































































and obviously it is a dominant strategy for each country to implement the
e¢cient decisions. When e¢cient choices are adopted, under our scheme the
transfer (6) to each country consists of two parts: a payment that covers
its payo¤ variation incurred by the shift from a Nash equilibrium to the
optimum, and a share of the total utility surplus extracted by moving to the
international optimum. The following remarks are in order:





b pi; b p¡i
´
=0 ;
² state i’s utility with transfers, denoted wi,i s :
w










i( b U ¡ U) > U
i ; 8i; (7)
where b U =
P
j
b Uj; so they are individually rational;
² in CT the sharing rule Ki was de…ned by the relative intensity of coun-
try i’s preference for the (unique) public bad component of the problem.
The sharing rule we propose in this paper is de…ned using a combina-
tion of the previous idea with the min function. When there is only
one public bad, our sharing rule boils down to the CT one. Otherwise,
this new formula makes use, for each state, only of that public bad with
the smallest relative incentive to pursue the international interest.
The central property is that such transfers prevent free-riding by coali-
tions in the following sense:
Theorem: The imputation w =( w1;:::;wn) belongs to the °-core of the
game [N;w°].
Proof: see Appendix A.
This result has two virtues: i) it establishes the non-emptiness of the °-
core, ii) it allows one to compute a °-core allocation. As in CT the robustness
against free riding of the °-core imputation can be restated as follows: given
6the sharing of w°(N) proposed to all the players, if some coalition S contem-
plates the possibility to free ride in order to achieve an other arrangement on
her own, the other players acting as rational singletons is su¢cient to make
this free riding less attractive than the proposed solution.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In a quite speci…c framework (log additive production functions, linear dam-
age functions) where the production of a private good induces the emission
of multiple pollutants, our extension of CT’s formula features two important
properties: i) there exists a transfer scheme such that a coalition-proof in-
ternational optimum can be achieved and ii) the share of country i in the
ecological surplus redistribution is solely related to that input with the small-
est relative marginal (dis-)utility. This new formula substantially enhances
the practical relevance of CT’s seminal papers; also all the existing theoret-
ical analyses where this formula has been used could be extended to many
pollutants. Further research should test the robustness of this new formula
using more general speci…cations for the production functions and utility
functions. This task is currently taken up by the authors.
Appendix
A A ni m p u t a t i o ni nt h e°-core
Suppose that the imputation w does not belong to the core. Then, there
would exist a coalition S and a partial agreement equilibrium with respect









Consider then the alternative imputation b w =( b w1;:::; b wn) with typical
elements de…ned as:
b w
i = b U
i + b µ
i





= ¡( b U
i ¡ e U
i)+K
i( b U ¡ e U)


















but then the imputation b w induces an aggregate welfare for all countries
that is higher than w, an impossibility that proves the theorem.



























To show 2, it is su¢cient to show that b µ
j
¸ µ
j;8j 2 N n S :
¡( b U
i ¡ e U
i)+K
i( b U ¡ e U) ¸¡ ( b U
i ¡ U
i)+K




i( e U ¡ U)







;i =1 ;:::;n and h =1 ;:::;m : (9)
or equivalently ¹ pi
h =1 =¼i
h: This is a dominant strategy equilibrium and the
private good production of a typical country evaluated at such an equilibrium




h. As for the ambient pollutants we have:







h =1 ;:::;m :




b xi, meaning that
the international optimum is characterized by a resource allocation favoring
less pollution and less private good.
Given (2) and the …rst order conditions for the players outside the coali-
tion at the disagreement equilibrium and at the partial agreement equilib-













































h ¸ 0 ; 8i;8h:
The inequality (10) is therefore always veri…ed and the theorem is proved.
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